1
For the text of the Convention, see I.L. M. 668 (1980) . 448-449 (2009) ("well-functioning commercial system requires a high degree of legal certainty; businesses will hesitate to enter into contractual relationships if they are unable to forecast the risks associated with breakdowns in those relationships"). 5 See, e.g., Marcus G. Larson, Applying the Uniform Sales Law to International Software Transactions: The Use of the CISG, its Shortcomings, and a Comparative Look at how the Proposed UCC Article 2B Would Remedy them, 5 Tulane Journal of International and Comparative Law 445, 448 (1997) (stating that "[f] or the international practitioner, the Vienna Convention can be a useful and reliable resource in drafting international sales transactions because it provides for greater predictability of the law than would the observation of the respective domestic laws of the home countries of individual contracting parties"). 6 See also Robert Bejesky, The Evolution in and International Convergence of the Doctrine of Specific Performance in Three Types of States, 13 Indiana International and Comparative Law Review 353, 398 (2003) ("private sector actors desire enhanced certainty in transnational business dealings"; James J. Callaghan, U.N. Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods: Examining the Gap-Filling Role of CISG in Two French Decisions, 14 Journal of Law and Commerce 183, 185 (1995) ("[e] nhancing certainty in the realm of international sales will greatly facilitate the flow of international trade and serve the interests of all parties engaged in commerce"); Hannu Honka, Harmonization of Contract Law Through International Trade: A Nordic Perspective, 11 Tulane European and Civil Law Forum 111, 117 (1996) ("[f] ree international trade functions better in a legally harmonized environment than in the opposite situation. Also, harmonization of contract law is presumed to save costs as the 'legal picture' is simplified"); Brooke Overby, Contract, in the Age of Sustainable Consumption, 27 Journal of Corporation Law 603, 623 (2002) (according to whom "the development of international business and consumer markets creates needs for uniformity and predictability of law"); in case law see Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler ChryslerPlymouth, Inc., 473 U. S. 614, 639-40 (1985) , where the U. S. Supreme Court expressly referred to "the need of the international commercial system for predictability in the resolution of disputes". (and still constitute) 9 "an obstacle to economic relationships which constantly increase among citizens of different countries; an obstacle above all for the enterprises that are involved in international commerce and that acquire primary resources or distribute goods in different countries which all have different law." 10 However, the approach taken by the drafters of the CISGcreating a set of uniform substantive law rules -while certainly able to promote certainty and predictability in international commerce, is not the only approach that may result in predictability and certainty. 11 The drafting of uniform rules of private international law, an approach that is even much older 12 than the aforementioned one -which is particularly associated with only the latter half of the last century 13 -also does the same. 14 Unlike uniform substantive law, which aims at guaranteeing that all parties from countries where the uniform substantive law is in force have equal access to the substantive law solutions, 15 uniform private international law, by making sure "that courts will apply the same legal rules no matter where the parties litigate the dispute", 16 "assures a business entering into a contract with a foreign enterprise that no matter what forum a dispute is brought before, the uniform choice-of-law rules will apply the same country's substantive law." 17 The foregoing difference leads some commentators to -rightly -suggest that the unification of substantive law rules is, where at all possible, preferred over the unification of private international law rules, on the grounds that uniform substantive law rules are "of a higher level" 18 or "superior" 19 vis-à-vis uniform private international law rules. 20 From a practical point of view, this means, inter alia, that whenever the court of a contracting State to a given uniform substantive law convention has to determine the substantive rules to apply to an international contract prima facie governed by that convention, it must resort to that convention rather than to its private international law rules. This result has been justified on two grounds: first, that the rules of a uniform substantive law convention, like the CISG, are more specific insofar as their sphere of application is more limited; and further, that they lead directly to a substantive solution, while resort to private international law requires a two-step approach, that is, the identification of the applicable law and the application thereof. 21 It must be pointed out, however, that the prevalence of uniform substantive law vis-à-vis private international law (irrespective of whether it is uniform or not), does not necessarily lead to the conclusion, incorrectly drawn by some commentators, that resort to private international law is irreconcilable with the uniform substantive law approach. 22 This statement, not unlike similar ones suggesting that uniform substantive law can do away with recourse to private international law, 23 is incorrect. For certainty and predictability in international commercial transactions to be attained, it is necessary to recognize that there is an unavoidable interplay between private international law and the CISG, as the costs for wrongly relying on the view here criticized are much too high. 24 The coming into force of the CISG, 9 See Willem Calkoen, Globalization and the Future of International Practice of Law from a European Perspective, European Journal of Law Reform 491, 492 and 498 (2000) . 10 Francesco Galgano, Il diritto uniforme: la vendita internazionale, in Atlante di diritto privato comparato 245, 245 (Francesco Galgano et als. eds., 5th ed, 2011 The CISG is not the only uniform substantive law instrument in relation to which statements to the effect that the uniform substantive law excludes resort to private international law have been made. Similar statements have been made, for instance, in relation to the CISG's predecessors, the 1964 Hague Uniform Sales Laws. 25 Such statements were triggered by the text of the ULIS and the ULF, both of which contain provisions explicitly stating that for the purposes of their application private international law rules were to be excluded. 26 Still, despite the aforementioned provisions, even under the 1964 Hague Uniform Sales Laws it was incorrect to state that resort to private international law rules was precluded. 27 As one commentator correctly pointed out, " [e] ven the adoption of the [1964 Hague] Uniform Law [s] everywhere in the world would not exclude the need for conflicts rules […] : the Uniform Law [s] do not regulate all questions in the sales field […] . In the end, the blackballed rules of private international law will have to be rediscovered and resorted to." 28 Unfortunately, only few delegates participating in the 1964 Hague Diplomatic Conference seem to have understood this, which is why the aforementioned provisions, expressly excluding private international law rules from being relevant for the purposes of the 1964 Hague Uniform Sales Laws, were inserted in the first place.
The aforementioned provisions make it undoubtedly more difficult to depart from the more traditional way of seeing the relationship between uniform substantive law and private international law as an antagonistic one and, thus, to see that there is room for resort to private international law even where a uniform substantive law instrument is in force in the forum country. Thus, it does not really surprise that statements were made in respect of the 1964 Hague Uniform Sales Laws according to which there is no room for recourse to private international law where uniform substantive law rules apply. What is surprising is that similar statements can also be found in discussions surrounding the CISG. One author, for instance, asserts that " [a] n important function of the CISG is to eliminate, or at least to reduce, the need to resort to conflict of laws rules"; 29 another author claims that the CISG "should substantially reduce the need for choice of law by […] courts", 30 or, as yet another author puts it, "[p]arties will be forced to rely upon complicated conflict of law rules in fewer transactions if the Convention is widely applied."
31 Even more surprisingly, this view finds support in the UNCITRAL Secretariat's Commentary on the 1978 Draft Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, according to which one of the Convention's three principal goals is to "reduce the necessity of resorting to rules of private international law." 32 Even a superficial reading of the CISG shows that these statements are misleading insofar as they make one believe that the CISG's uniform substantive rules preclude resort to private international law: the CISG itself expressly refers in two places (namely in Articles 1(1)(b) and 7(2)) to private international law). 33 Moreover, given the contexts in which reference to private international law is made, the importance of private international law for CISG-related transactions and problems becomes evident. In effect, Article 1(1)(b) lets even the applicability of the CISG itself to depend (where the CISG is not "directly" 34 "autonomously" 35 applicable due to the parties having their relevant places of business in different Contracting States to the CISG (Article 1(1)(a))) on a private international law analysis; 36 Article 1(1) indeed states that the CISG "applies to contracts of sale of goods between parties whose places of business are in different States: […] (b) when the rules of private international law lead to the application of the law of a Contracting State", 37 thus unambiguously making resort to private international law necessary even for the purpose of the CISG's own applicability (where the Article 1(1)(a) requirements are not met).
The importance of private international law for the CISG can also be derived from Article 7(2), the CISG's provision on gapfilling that refers to private international law as a means to determine rules on the basis of which to fill (some of) the CISG's gaps. 38 Aside from Articles 1(1)(b) and 7(b), there are other instances as well, albeit less apparent ones, when resort to private international law cannot be foregone.
III. The Concept of Private International
Law under the CISG Despite the aforementioned importance for the CISG of the concept of "private international law", 39 expressly referred to, as already mentioned, in two places by the CISG text itself, the concept is not defined in the CISG. 40 One has to wonder whether this means that the concept is to be interpreted, not unlike most other concepts used in the CISG, by having regard to the CISG's "international character and the need to promote uniformity in its application" -i. But are these differences really relevant? Obviously, such differences would be irrelevant if the concept at hand were to be interpreted autonomously. In this author's opinion, however, the concept at hand is one of the concepts which have to be construed in light of the applicable domestic law, 50 as also expressly stated by various courts. 51 The CISG "merely" constitutes a substantive law convention 52 and does not set forth any private international law rules. 53 This leads one to conclude that where the CISG itself refers to "private international law", it refers to a domestic concept of "private international law"; 54 more specifically, it refers to the private international law of the forum, 55 as confirmed by various courts.
56 This is why it is, for instance, incorrect to criticize, as some commentators do, an Austrian court's decision 57 for employing the doctrine of renvoi on the grounds that the CISG rejects the renvoi doctrine. 58 As the CISG does not set forth any rule of private international law, it does not deal with the issue of renvoi either. Furthermore, at the time the Austrian decision was rendered, renvoi was a doctrine recognized by Austrian private international law, thus requiring the court to take into account the private international law rules of the country to which the Austrian private international law lead.
From what has just been said, it becomes apparent that whenever a court has to resort to private international law in the CISG context, it will have to resort to its own private international rules, irrespective of whether the matters in dispute relate to those in respect of which the CISG itself refers to the need for a private international law approach or to one of the many other ones that require resort to private international law.
IV. The CISG's Limited International
Sphere of Application
The following parts of this paper will be devoted to identifying the many reasons why it is incorrect to state that the coming into force of the CISG in a given country prevents the courts of that country from having to resort to private international law. Some, albeit not all, of the reasons relate to the CISG's applicability being subject to various requirements, which makes it necessary to clearly distinguish between the CISG's coming into force and its applicability, a distinction that seems to be overlooked by those suggesting that the coming into force of the CISG prevents recourse to private international law. The first CISG requirement that comes to one's mind when examining the relationship between the CISG and private international law is the CISG's internationality requirement; after all, 46 For a reference to countries that do not acknowledge party autonomy as connecting factor, see Basedow, previous note, at 34 ff.; Jochen Schrçder and Christian Wenner, Internationales Vertragsrecht 9 ff. (2nd ed., 1998). , 1984) , stating that the "law" referred to in Article 1(1)(b) is "substantive law" on the grounds that "there is a general reluctance to inquire into the conflict of laws rules recognized by another jurisdiction, as suggested, for example, by the general disapproval of the doctrine of renvoi." (Id.)
IHR 3/2012 95 | it is internationality that triggers recourse to private international law. The CISG's international sphere of application, like its substantive sphere of application, 59 is limited. 60 In effect, according to Article 1(1) of the CISG, the internationality of a contract depends solely 61 on the parties having their places of business (or, where the parties do not have a place of business, their habitual residence) 62 -at the time of the conclusion of the contract 63 -in different States.
64
Where this "subjective" 65 internationality requirement is not met, the CISG will not be applicable per se, 66 even if the contract's performance involves different States, 67 as emphasized both in legal writing 68 and case law. 69 This, however, does not necessarily signify that the contract for the sale of goods is not an international one; it merely means that it does not meet the CISG's internationality requirement. The importance of this distinction becomes apparent if one considers the consequences of not meeting the CISG's internationality requirement. In this situation, the court will not have to further look into the CISG's applicability; instead, the court will have to turn to its rules of private international law to determine the domestic law applicable to the contract. This law will necessarily be different from that laid down by the CISG, even if the rules of private international law lead to the law of a contracting State. Ultimately, this goes to show that despite the entry into force of the CISG in a given country, there is still a great deal of room for a private international law approach by the courts of that country, even where the CISG substantive applicability requirements (to be dealt with below) are met.
70
In light of Article 1(2) of the CISG, one can go even further and state that even where the contract also meets the internationality requirement, as set forth in Article 1(1) of the CISG, resort to private international law may be necessary even for internationality-related purposes. Article 1(2) of the CISG requires, as emphasized by many courts, 71 that the internationality under Article 1(1) be disregarded whenever the fact that the parties have their places of business in different States does not appear either from the contract, or from any dealings between or from information disclosed by the parties, at any time before or at the conclusion of the contract.
72 By introducing Article 1 (2) 72 According to Audit, supra note 41, at 19, the apparent internationality does not suffice; the parties must know that they have concluded a contract which is to be considered an international one under the CISG.
CISG intended to protect the parties' reliance upon the domestic setting of their contract. 73 This intention of the drafters cannot be stressed often enough, given a recent decision by a U. S. court 74 that appears to have misunderstood this. The U. S. court interpreted Article 1(2) of the CISG to mean that it protects the parties' reliance upon the CISG's (in)applicability. This is incorrect; Article 1(2) CISG merely protects the parties' reliance upon the domestic setting in which their transaction is embedded.
To summarize, where the parties' reliance upon the domestic setting deserves protection, the CISG cannot apply, despite the contract's internationality under Article 1(1). This means that courts have to determine the applicable law by resorting to their rules of private international law, which necessarily will make applicable a set of rules different from those of the CISG, even where its rules of private international law lead to the law of a contracting State.
According to various commentators, the "essential application" 75 of Article 1(2) of the CISG arises in a case in which one party that has its place of business in one State concludes a contract with another party that has its place of business in that same State, without disclosing the fact that it is acting on behalf of someone else who has his place of business in a different State.
76
In such a case, the internationality of the transaction depends upon who is considered a "party" to the contract. As pointed out both in legal writing 77 and in case law, 78 unlike most other expressions used in the CISG, the concept of party is not one that has to be interpreted "autonomously", i.e., without having regard to concepts of a particular domestic law. 79 Rather, the question of who is a "party" to a contract is "to be solved on the basis of the law applicable by virtue of the rules of private international law of the forum".
80 This is in line with the view held both in legal writing and case law 81 stipulating that agency is a matter with which the CISG is not concerned.
Ultimately, what has just been said means that courts may at times have to resort to private international law even to determine the internationality of a contract under the CISG, at least when the exporter and the importer are not the only parties involved in the conclusion of the contract.
V. The CISG's Limited Substantive
Like all other uniform substantive law conventions, 82 the CISG's sphere of application ratione materiae 83 is limited, 84 too. This, of course, means that where a given international contract falls outside that -limited -substantive sphere of application, one has to determine which law applies by resorting to the private international law rules (of the forum).
What has just been said can best be exemplified by referring to Article 2 of the CISG, which restricts the CISG's substantive sphere of application 85 by expressly excluding a limited number of exhaustively listed 86 categories of contracts, thus laying down 73 Franco Ferrari, The CISG's sphere of application: Articles 1-3 and 10, in
The Draft UNCITRAL Digest and Beyond, supra note 41, 21, 31; see also Winship, supra note 11, at 518, stating that "Article 1(2) protects parties from surprise by requiring that both parties be on notice that their businesses are in different countries". 89 In effect, the exclusions are based on either (1) the purpose of the acquisition of the goods (Article 2 (a)), (2) the type of sales contract (Article 2(b) and (c)), or (3) the kind of goods sold (Article 2(d), (e) and (f)).
90
As far as these exclusions go, it is commonly understood that they are farther reaching than those provided for by the 1964 Hague Uniform Sales Laws.
91 This is evidenced, for example, by the exclusion of auction sales from the CISG's substantive sphere of application, 92 an exclusion that is not found in the 1964 Hague Uniform Sales Laws.
93
In addition to this type of sale, Article 2 also excludes from the CISG's substantive sphere of application the sale of goods bought for personal use, so as to avoid a conflict between the CISG rules and domestic laws aimed at consumer protection.
94 Unfortunately, as pointed out by the German Supreme Court in a recent decision, there is still potential for conflict, 95 since domestic law may, and often does, define "consumer sales" differently, creating cases of potential overlap.
96 Indeed, for a contract to be a "consumer sale" under the CISG and, thus, to fall outside the CISG's sphere of application under Article 2(a), the contract must be one for the sale of goods bought exclusively for a non-commercial purpose, 97 i.e., for "personal" use, 98 business or profession. The fact that the goods are consumer goods is, generally speaking, irrelevant for the purposes of the Article 2(a) exclusion.
101 Furthermore, Article 2(a) requires that the "consumer" purpose of the purchase be known (or ought to have been known) to the seller at the time of the conclusion of the contract.
102 Consequently, it is irrelevant whether the seller in effect knows of the non-commercial purpose of the purchase after the conclusion of the contract.
103
It is worth mentioning that Article 2(a) compares family and household use to personal use. It is doubtful, however, whether the express contemplation of "family and household use" adds anything to the exclusion of the sale of goods bought for personal use, 104 since the former exclusions merely represent examples of "personal use".
105
As already pointed out, 106 the Article 2 exclusions are based not only upon the purpose of the acquisition of the goods or upon the type of sales contract (such as auction sales, sales on execution, or otherwise by authority of law mentioned in Article 2(c)), but also on the kind of goods sold (Article 2(d), (e) and (f)).
107 In this respect, it must be mentioned that Article 2(d) expressly excludes the sales of stocks, shares, investment securities, negotiable instruments, and money from the CISG's sphere of application, 108 in order to avoid a conflict between CISG rules and domestic rules that often are mandatory.
109
The exclusions of the sale of ships, 110 vessels, hovercrafts, and aircrafts 111 provided for in Article 2(e) fall within the same category as the exclusion of commercial papers and money, 112 that is, sales excluded on the basis of the nature of the goods sold.
113
Finally, the exclusion from the CISG's sphere of application of sales contracts regarding electricity 114 deserves special mention. According to some authors, the exclusion de quo can be justified on the ground of electricity's "unique" nature 115 or "[…] on the ground that in many legal systems electricity is not considered to be a good".
116 Neither justification appears to be convincing.
117
Indeed, the former justification overlooks the fact that there are other goods, such as gas 118 and crude oil, 119 whose sale presents "unique" problems, 120 but which are governed by the CISG, 121 as are the sales of other sources of energy.
122 The latter justification is not convincing either, "[…] because the Convention may create its own definition of good."
123 Indeed, the exclusion of electricity sales from the CISG's sphere of application cannot be justified.
From all of the foregoing, one can easily derive that limitations to the CISG's substantive sphere of application constitute another reason for resorting to private international law: where a given contract for the international sale of goods falls outside the CISG's limited substantive sphere of application, one has to determine which law applies by resorting to the private international law rules (of the forum). Generally, internationality alone -except in very few cases, such as under the 1964 Hague Uniform Sales Laws 124 -is not sufficient to make an international uniform contract law convention applicable. Most uniform contract law conventions also require the existence of a specific link between the contract, the parties, 125 or the places relevant with respect to a specific kind of contract (such as the place of taking over the goods, or the place designated for delivery, relevant for contracts for the carriage of goods 126 ) and a contracting State or the law of such a State.
127
As a consequence, a contract falling within both the international and the substantive spheres of application of an international uniform substantive law convention is generally not governed by that convention, unless the aforementioned connection with a contracting State or the law of a contracting State also exists.
128
What has just been said holds true with respect to the CISG as well.
129 Even where a contract is one for the international sale of goods as defined by the CISG, it is not necessarily governed by the CISG, as the CISG also requires either that the parties have their places of business in different contracting States (which leads to the "direct application" 130 of the CISG by virtue of Article 1(1)(a)) or that the private international law rules of the forum 131 lead to the law of a contracting State 132 (which leads to the "indirect application"
133 by virtue of Article 1(1)(b)). As pointed out by one scholar, by setting forth this further requirement, the drafters of the CISG created a distinction between two types of international contracts for the sale of goods: (1) those contracts to which the CISG applies, and (2) those contracts to which the CISG does not apply and which are therefore subject to the applicable domestic law. 134 In other words, the drafters themselves created a distinction between contracts for the international sale of goods governed by the CISG and contracts for the international sale of goods governed by sources of law other than the CISG -to be identified, most certainly, on the basis of the rules of private international law.
By introducing the aforementioned requirement, the drafters of the CISG introduced one more reason why resort to private international law cannot necessarily be avoided under the CISG. Not only, due to that requirement, resort to private international law may well be necessary to even determine whether the CISG is applicable at all. As regards the CISG's "indirect applicability", this is evident from the wording of Article 1(1)(b) itself, which lets the applicability of the CISG depend, where one or even both parties do not have their place of business in Contracting States, 135 on whether "the rule of private international lead to the law of a contracting State". 138 the CISG will generally be applicable when the law chosen by the parties or, absent a choice of law, the law having the closest connection with the contract (Art. 4(1) of the Rome Convention) or the law of the seller (Art. 4(1)(a) of the Rome I Regulation), is the law of a Contracting State.
139
As far as party autonomy under the Rome Convention is concerned 140 -and the same holds true for the Rome I Regulation 141 that replaced the Rome Convention as regards contracts concluded on or after 18 December 2009 -this does not raise too many problems, it being a concept widely acknowledged throughout European private international law codifications long before even the coming into force of the foregoing European instruments.
142 This is why party autonomy does not cause too many difficulties with respect to contracts for the international sale of goods, 143 as evidenced by the fact that several courts 144 as well as arbitral tribunals 145 have already relied upon the parties' designation of the applicable law to make the CISG applicable under Article 1(1)(b).
Absent a choice of law, the Rome Convention makes applicable the law of the country with which the contract is most closely connected, as also pointed out by several court decisions rendered under the CISG. 146 Since it is presumed that the contract is most closely connected with the country where the party who is to effect the contract's characteristic performance has its place of business 147 -and since the monetary obligation is generally not As regards the Rome I Regulation, the result is basically the same, since its Article 4(1)(a) states that "a contract for the sale of goods shall be governed by the law of the country where the seller has his habitual residence."
155
From what has just been said one can easily gather that the suggestion that the CISG prevents resort to private international law is obviously untenable, as the CISG's (indirect) applicability depends entirely on a private international law approach.
VII. The CISG's Applicability Requirements
Stricto Sensu: Article 1(1)(a)
While Article 1(1)(b) expressly requires resort to private international law to lead to the CISG's applicability, according to both courts 156 and commentators 157 Article 1(1)(a) leads to the CISG's "direct" applicability without the need for any such resort, as Article 1(1)(a) "merely" requires that the parties have, at the time of the conclusion of the contract, 158 their relevant place of business in different contracting States. This, however, is not necessarily correct. There are instances where even the CISG's "direct" applicability will depend on the outcome of a private international law analysis. This is true, for example, in respect of those instances where an agent is involved in the conclusion of the sales contract and the agent's place of business is located in a country other than that in which the principal's place of business is located. In these instances, the CISG's "direct" applicability, will depend on whether it is the agent or the principal who is party to the contract with the opposing party. 159 Since, however, the CISG does not deal with the issue of agency, as often stated both by courts 160 and commenta-148 tors, 161 resort to private international law is necessary to determine the law applicable to the principal-agency relationship, 162 as it is on the basis of that applicable law that the issue of who is party to the contract will need to be decided. 163 Most domestic laws will decide the issue on the basis of whether the agent disclosed the principal or not. 164 If the agent did not do so, it is generally the agent who will be bound rather than the principal. The opposite is true where the agent did disclose the principal.
165
But even where no agent is involved and the parties to the contract have their relevant place of business in two different contracting States the CISG's applicability pursuant to Article 1 (1)(a) may be doubtful -and resort to a private international law analysis necessary, since the CISG provides for the possibility for contracting States to declare certain reservations which have an impact on the CISG's direct applicability, i.e., even when both parties have their relevant place of business in a contracting State.
One such reservation is that provided in Article 94. Pursuant to this provision, "[t]wo or more Contracting States which have the same or closely related legal rules on matters governed by this Convention may at any time declare that the Convention is not to apply to contracts of sale or to their formation where the parties have their places of business in those States". The rationale behind this provision, introduced upon the request of the Scandinavian countries, 166 the only ones to declare this reservation, 167 is to make the CISG inapplicable to contractual relationships between parties that have their places of business in countries that have a sales law that is largely uniform, 168 thus allowing regional unification efforts not to become superfluous. 169 Consequently, the CISG will not be applicable where both parties have their relevant place of business in contracting States that made an Article 94 declaration, thus once again making it necessary to resort to the private international law rules of the forum to determine the applicable law. If the applicable law is that of a contracting State (independently of whether it declared a reservation or not), the CISG will not apply; rather the applicable domestic law will apply. This view appears to be shared by most authors, at least in respect to the line of cases in which the court is located in a State that made an Article 94 declaration. There is a dispute, however, as to whether the court of non-reservation contracting States as well have to take into consideration Article 94 declarations, i.e., whether judges from non-reservation contracting States will have to apply domestic law rather than the CISG to a contract concluded between two parties having their places of business in reservation contracting States. According to the preferable view, 170 the courts of non-reservation contracting State will not have to take into consideration that reservation, and, consequently, will have to apply the CISG in such cases pursuant to Article 1(1)(a), as the Article 94 does not have an impact on the status of contracting State of any contracting State declaring such reservation. Of course, if one were to adopt the opposing view, then recourse to a private international law analysis would be necessary in similar cases to determine the applicable (domestic) law.
VIII. The CISG's Articles 92 and 93 Reservations as Reasons for the Need for Recourse to Private International Law
Article 94 CISG is not the only CISG provision to have an impact on the CISG's direct applicability and, thus, to impose a private internationsal law analysis. Article 92 also does so; actually, the very purpose behind the introduction of this provision was to allow some countries, namely Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden, to rely on a set of rules other than those of the CISG, namely their (regionally unified) own rules. 171 These countries proposed to allow contracting States to make a declaration pursuant to which they would not be bound by either Part II or Part III of the CISG, dealing with the "Formation of Contract" and "The rights and obligations of the parties" respectively. In doing so, they intended to make sure that their rules on formation of Journal of Law and Commerce 289, 290 (1999) . 169 For papers on the relationship between the CISG and regional unification efforts, see, e.g., Luca Castellani, Assurer l'harmonisation du droit des contrats aux niveaux regional et mondial: la Convention des Nations Unies sur les contrats de vente internationale de merchandises et le rôle de la CNUDCI, Uniform Law Review 101 (2008) 
172 This is why all the aforementioned Scandinavian countries made a declaration according to which they would not be bound by Part II of the CISG (on "Formation of Contract"). Whether these countries were fully aware of the consequences of a similar declaration is doubtful. Given the rationale behind their proposal to introduce the possibility of declaring that reservation, it appears that these countries were convinced that a simple declaration would ensure the applicability of their own domestic law. This view is not tenable. The effect of an Article 92 declaration is much more limited, as well as much more complicated. It is more limited insofar as there will be instances where the CISG will still prevail over the law of the reservation State;
173 it is more complicated insofar as the declaration of an Article 92 reservation obliges courts of contracting States to resort to a private international law analysis, thus showing once again that the CISG cannot do away with resort to private international law, and this even where both parties to the contract have their relevant place of business in a contracting State to the CISG.
The effect of this reservation is set forth in Article 92 CISG itself: a party that has its relevant place of business in an Article 92 reservation State is considered to have its place of business in a non-contracting State for the purposes of the Part excluded.
174
Thus, where one party has its place of business in such a State, the CISG can never be applicable by virtue of Art. 1(1)(a) CISG in its entirety.
175 Article 1(1)(a) will merely lead to the application of the Part by which both States in which the parties have their places of business are bound. 176 This does not necessarily mean that the Part to which the reservation relates does not apply; 177 rather, that Part's applicability will depend on whether the rules of private international law of the forum lead to the law of a Contracting State that did not make such a declaration. 178 If they do, the Part excluded will apply by virtue of Article 1(1)(b), 179 as also stated in case law.
180
It should be noted, however, that according to both commentators 181 and courts, 182 the foregoing solution applies not only if a dispute is brought before the courts of a Contracting State that did not declare an Article 92 reservation, but also where the forum is located in a State that did declare such a reservation.
Where, on the contrary, the private international law rules lead to the law of a contracting State that had declared the Article 92 reservation, that State's domestic law will apply, a view held, among others, by a German court: 183 The court held that since both Germany and Denmark were contracting States at the moment of the conclusion of the contract, the CISG applied by virtue of Article 1(1)(a), except in so far as the formation of the contract was concerned. Since Denmark had made an Article 92 reservation by virtue of which it is not bound by Part II of the CISG, it cannot "be considered a contracting State within paragraph (1) of article 1 172 It should be noted that no domestic rule is per se replaced by the CISG, as the CISG solely applies to "international" contract for the sale of goods. Thus, the CISG does not impact on domestic law, in the sense that it does not per se modify the domestic rules which already exist. In effect, due only to its persuasiveness, the CISG has constituted the model of recent revisions of domestic law. In this respect, see, e.g., Evelyn Nau, Das What has just been said clearly shows that the very existence of Article 92 CISG suggests that is is incorrect to hold that the CISG prevents recourse to private international law.
A reasoning similar to the foregoing one applies in those cases where at least one of the parties to the contract has its place of business in a territorial unit of a contracting State that made an Article 93 declaration pursuant to which the CISG does not extend to that territorial unit: by virtue of Article 93(3) the CISG cannot apply (at all) by virtue of Article 1(1)(a) CISG, 185 because the party that has its place in that territorial unit is considered to have its place of business in a non-contracting State. 186 Consequently, where the forum is located in a contracting State, the CISG can only be applicable to such a contract by virtue of Article 1(1) (b), provided that the rules of private international law lead to the law of a contracting State that did not declare an Article 93 reservation.
187 Where the rules of private international law lead to either the law of the reservation State or that of a non-contracting State, rules other than those of the CISG will apply. Irrespective, however, of the law ultimately applicable, what is important is that it must be determined by means of the private international law rules.
IX. The CISG's Limited Scope of Application:
Internal Gaps
While the foregoing reasons for resort to private international law not becoming superfluous with the coming into force of the CISG all somehow relate to the CISG's applicability, those reasons are not the only ones. Recourse to a private international law analysis may be necessary even where the CISG is applicable. This can easily be derived from the CISG itself which, as mentioned earlier, 188 expressly refers to the need for resort to private international in relation to the issue of gap-filling.
Even though some commentators state that the CISG is "a comprehensive code governing international sales of goods" 189 and "addressing contracting generally" 190 and, therefore, governs all international sales transactions 191 and "exhaustively deals with all problems", 192 the CISG is neither a comprehensive code nor does it constitute an exhaustive body of rules, 193 i.e., it does not provide solutions to all matters that may originate from an international sale. 194 From this one can easily gather how important the issue of gap filling is. And it is in relation to this issue as well that express reference is made in the CISG to the need to resort to the rules of private international law (of the forum). 195 In effect, pursuant to Article 7(2), resort to private international is to be had for the purpose of solving "matters governed by [the CISG] which are not expressly settled in it", i.e., for filling the gaps praeter legem, 196 or "internal" 197 or "hidden" 198 gaps, and which cannot be filled by resorting to the general principles the CISG is based on.| pressly settled by it, one has to first determine whether a general principle can be identified upon which the CISG is based and which allows one to settle the matter. 201 To the extent that recourse to a general principle underlying the CISG cannot settle the matter, Article 7(2) does not just allow resort to the rules of private international law, it imposes such resort. 202 This does not mean that recourse to the rules of private international law should be abused. 203 Rather, one has to always keep in mind that the drafters of the CISG wanted to close the types of gaps at hand as much as possible from within the CISG itself, 204 so as to promote the uniformity aimed at by the CISG. It is, however, worth pointing out that recourse to general principles constitutes merely one method of filling gaps from within. 205 One has to wonder whether Article 7(2) of the CISG also covers other methods of legal reasoning, such as analogical application. 206 In this respect, this author shares the opinion of those commentators who assert not only that the CISG permits resort to analogy as a means to fill gaps, but also that "[i]n the case of a gap [praeter legem] in the Convention the first attempt to be made is to settle the unsolved question by means of an analogical application of specific provisions." 207 However, when the matters settled in the CISG and the issue the internal gaps refers to are not so closely related that it would be justified to adopt a different solution, 208 one must resort to the general principles as contemplated in Article 7(2) CISG. This procedure differs from the analogical application in that it does not resolve the specific case solely by extending specific provisions dealing with analogous matters, "but on the basis of principles and rules which because of their general character may be applied on a much wider scale." 209 Ultimately, what has been said thus far means that recourse to the rules of private international law "represents under the […] uniform law a last resort to be used only if and to the extent that a solution cannot be found either by analogical application of specific provisions or by the application of 'general principles' underlying the uniform law as such", 210 which, it is worth pointing out, promotes uniformity as much as the autonomous interpretation of the CISG mentioned earlier.
X. The CISG's Limited Scope of Application:
External Gaps
At this point, it is worth pointing out that a private international law analysis has not been resorted to often to fill the aforementioned (internal) gaps. Where courts and commentators have resorted to a general principle at all, they have generally settled the matter through the general principle, thus avoiding the need for a private international law analysis. The aforementioned matters have, however, to be distinguished from the matters that are excluded from the CISG's limited scope of application.
211 These matters -labelled either "external gaps" 212 or gaps "intra legem" 213 -must, despite the lack of a specific provision to that effect, directly be solved in conformity with the law applicable by virtue of the rules of private international law 214 (or, where applicable, with other uniform substantive law conventions), 215 as also pointed out in case law. 216 This approach is completely different from the one relating to the one to be adopted in respect of the internal gaps. From this, one can easily derive not only how important the exact distinction between the aforementioned types of gaps is, but also how the attitude towards resort to private international law may shape how certain matters are dealt with. In effect, whereas some commentators will have resort to private international law only rarely, because they are convinced that the CISG displaces the need for such resort and feel more comfortable with recourse to general principles, and, therefore, will have no problem interpreting the CISG's scope broadly, other commentators will be inclined to favor the private international law approach. 217 This problem is not limited to commentators; courts also have difficulties in determining whether a matter has to be settled by resorting to the CISG's general principles rather than by having recourse to private international law to determine the substantive rules to apply. This is evidenced, for instance, by the contradictory case law in respect of the determination of the place of performance of monetary obligations other than that of the payment of price. 218 When determining the place of payment of compensation due for non-conformity of the goods one court, for instance, stated that "if the purchase price is payable at the place of business of the seller" under Article 57, 219 then "this indicates a general principle valid for other monetary claims as well". 220 In a comparable situation, another court, considering an action for restitution of an excess in the price received by the seller, stated that there was a general principle under which "payment is to be made at the creditor's domicile". 221 The Austrian Supreme Court, which had previously adopted the reverse principle, decided that the gap of the CISG in respect of the legal consequences of avoidance, particularly with regard to the performance of restitution obligations, was to be filled by means of a general principle of the CISG, according to which "the place for performance of restitution obligations should be determined by transposing the primary IHR 3/2012 107 | obligations -through a mirror effect -into restitution obligations". 222 Whereas all the foregoing decisions assume that the matter is governed by, albeit not expressly settled in, the CISG, there is one decision which, in this author's opinion correctly, denies the existence of a general principle under the CISG to be used to determine the place of performance for all monetary obligations 223 and determines the place of performance more correctly by resorting to the law applicable by virtue of its private international law rules. 224 
XI. The CISG's Limited Scope of Application and Article 4 CISG
From the foregoing, it becomes apparent how important the distinction between the various types of gaps and their identification really are. Unfortunately, however, the CISG does not set forth specific criteria on how to make the distinction. Article 4 CISG provides, however, some help, as it contains a (non-exhaustive 225 ) list of matters the CISG is not concerned with, namely the validity of the contract or of any of its provisions or of any usage as well as the effect which the contract may have on the property in the goods sold.
At first sight, the aforementioned part of Article 4 does not seem to cause any problems (one author even stated that the provision at hand was superfluous since it only stated the obvious 226 ). Quite the contrary is true. The insertion, for instance, of the introductory wording to Article 4(a) and (b) "except as otherwise expressly provided in this Convention", leads to the conclusion that even where a dispute concerns a matter listed either in Article 4(a) or Article 4(b) and, thus, apparently excluded from the CISG's scope of application and therefore left (mostly) to the applicable law to be determined by resorting to the rules of private international law of the forum, one cannot simply disregard the CISG. Rather, one has to first examine whether the CISG provides a solution for the specific problem. 227 With reference to the validity, for instance, which according to Article 4(a) is a matter excluded from the CISG's scope of application, 228 this means that one has to first look into whether the validity issue in dispute is expressly dealt with by the CISG before resorting to the law applicable by virtue of the private international law rules. This is why, for instance, one cannot automatically resort to private international law rules to solve problems relating to the formal validity of the contract, since the CISG is ("expressly") concerned with it: Article 11 provides that a contract governed by the CISG need not be concluded in or evidenced by writing and is not subject to any other requirement of form, thus dealing with an issue that in many legal systems is considered to be an issue of validity. 229 The aforementioned problem is not the only one that arises from the exclusion of validity from the CISG's scope of application. Another (rather important) one is that of defining "validity" for the purposes of the CISG. The importance of that definition becomes evident when one considers how different the definitions found in the various legal systems actually are. 230 Various attempts at defining the concept were made by US courts; 231 according to those courts' decisions, a validity issue is "any issue by which the domestic law would render the contract void, voidable, or unenforceable." 232 Whether this definition will prevail remains to be seen. What can be said, however, is that even in applying that definition the outcome of those decisions that had to deal, for instance, with the issue of whether a contract was validly concluded by a third person acting on behalf of one of the parties would not have been different: that issue would still be considered one left to the applicable national law to be determined on the basis of the rules of private international law, since agency, as mentioned on several occasions already, is not governed by the CISG; neither is the validity of standard contract terms, as correctly pointed out in case law:
233 that issue is also left to the law applicable by virtue of the rules of private international law.
However, Article 4(a) does not only exclude from its scope the validity of the contract or of its provisions, such as the retention of title clauses inserted into the contract, 234 but also the validity of usages, which is why this issue as well is left to the domestic law to be identified by means of the relevant private international law rules. 235 This validity issue must, however, be distinguished from that of how usages are to be defined, under which circumstances they are binding for the parties and what their relationship is with the rules set forth in the CISG, as these issues are dealt with in Article 9. 236 Article 4 also makes clear that the CISG does not govern the passing of property of the goods sold, 237 thus making it necessary, once again, to resort to private international law rules to determine the applicable law.
XII. Personal Injury and Other Matters not Governed by the CISG
Article 4 CISG is, however, not the only provsion that expressly lists matters not governed by the CISG. According to its Article 5, the CISG is not concerned with the liability for death or personal injury caused by the goods to any person either, as also pointed out in case law. 238 Not unlike Article 4, at first sight Article 5 seems not to raise any problems; unfortunately, this is not true at all. One problem relates, for instance, 239 to whether the exclusion really is a general one, i.e., whether it really covers the liability for death or personal injury caused by the goods to "any person". In this respect is has been correctly pointed out that the exclusion covers "both injury to the buyer or others persons participating at least indirectly in the contract and also injury to non-participating third parties". 240 As a consequence of the liability for death or personal injury "to any person" being excluded from the CISG's scope of application, the buyer's claims for pecuniary loss resulting from a claim against the buyer itself for personal injury caused by the goods the buyer sold in a sub-sale is also excluded from the CISG's scope of application 241 and, therefore, has to be decided in conformity with the domestic law to be identified by means of the relevant rules of private international law.
Whereas liability for personal injury is excluded from the CISG's scope, liability for damage caused to property is not. 242 This, of course, may cause a conflict between contractual claims based on the CISG and tort claims based on domestic law. 243 The issue is whether the damaged party can also bring a tort claim or whether the CISG pre-empts that possibility, even though the CISG, as correctly pointed out in case law, is not concerned with tort law. 244 In this author's opinion, 245 the view according to which the CISG is exclusively applicable, 246 i.e., that it also prevails over all domestic tort law, 247 is to be rejected. 248 The reason for this can be summarized as follows: "If the goods are defec-IHR 3/2012 109 | tive -non-conforming to the contract or not -and cause bodily injury, we are outside the scope of the CISG, Article 5. But even if only property damages were caused, […] we are outside the principal domain of interests created by contracts and protected by contractual remedies, and would have entered the field of genuinely extra-contractual remedies. Therefore, a tort action for property damages caused by defective and non-conforming goods should not be barred by an omission to give notice within reasonable time under Article 30 of CISG." 249 Furthermore, the solution advocated here is also more compatible with the CISG's dispositive nature: if the CISG were to deal exclusively with all the claims -whether contractual or extra-contractual -arising from personal injury and the CISG were to be excluded (or the relevant provisions were derogated from), the damaged party would not able to claim damages for the personal injury at all. This cannot be. If this is true, then, however, one may have to have recourse to private international law to determine, for instance, the applicable tort law.
The aforementioned matters expressly listed as falling outside the CISG's scope of application are not the only ones the CISG is not concerned with. There are many other matters that do fall outside the CISG's scope of application 250 and are left to the applicable law which, where no other uniform law convention applies, such as the Uncitral Convention on the Limitation Period in the International Sale of Goods, is to be determined by means of the private international law rules of the forum. Among the matters identified by courts and commentators as not being at all governed by the CISG are, among others, the validity of a choice of forum clause, 251 the validity of a penalty clause, 252 the validity of a settlement agreement, 253 the assignment of receivables, 254 the assignment of contract, 255 statute of limitations, 256 the issue of whether a court has jurisdiction, 257 and generally, any other issue of procedural law, 258 the assumption of debts, 259 the acknowledgement of debts, 260 the effects of the contract on third parties 261 as well as the issue of whether one is jointly liable. 262 One court ruled that the question of who has priority rights in the goods as between the seller and the third party creditor was also beyond the scope of the CISG and had therefore to be governed by the applicable domestic law. 263 Whereas there is not too much dispute as to whether the foregoing matters are excluded from the CISG's scope of application, there are matters in respect of which case law is contradictory. This is true, to just give one example, in respect of set-off. Although the majority of cases rightly exclude it from the matters the CISG is concerned with, 264 there are some instances 265 in which courts stated that set-off was governed by the CISG provided that the receivables all arose from contract governed by the CISG.
From the foregoing remarks it becomes evident that the very nature of the CISG -it being a non-exhaustive uniform substantive law convention -makes it impossible for it to exclude all resort to private international law.
XIII. CISG and Party Autonomy
Even where all of the CISG's positive applicability requirements (the international one, the substantive one, the temporal one, the personal / territorial one) are met and the issues to be dealt with by the court are governed by the CISG, resort to private international law may be necessary. The most obvious reason for this is Article 6 of the CISG, which allows the parties to "exclude the application of this Convention or, subject to Article 12, derogate from or vary the effect of any of its provisions". By providing for this possibility, which business apparently takes advantage of rather often 266 for fear of the unknown, 267 the drafters of the CISG reaffirmed, despite some reservations, 268 one of the general principles already embodied in the 1964 Hague Uniform Sales Laws, 269 that is, the principle according to which the primary IHR 3/2012 111 | source of the rules governing international sales contracts 270 is party autonomy.
271 By stating that the CISG can be excluded, the drafters clearly acknowledged the CISG dispositive nature 272 -emphasized also in case law 273 -and the "central role which party autonomy plays in international commerce and, particularly, in international sales." 274 As far as party autonomy is concerned, it must be pointed out that Article 6 CISG refers to two different lines of cases:
275 one where the CISG's application is excluded, the other where the parties derogate from -or modify the effects of -the provisions of the CISG on a substantive level. 276 These two situations differ from each other in that the former does, according to the CISG, per se not encounter any restrictions, 277 whereas the latter is limited, since there are provisions the parties are not allowed to derogate from. 278 For the purpose of this paper, this distinction is important insofar as the rules to be applied in case of exclusion of the CISG are different from those to be applied in case the parties derogate from (or modify the effect of) the provisions of the CISG.
In the former case, the courts will have to resort to their rules of private international 279 to determine the applicable law (which, whenever they lead to the law a contracting State, make applicable that State's domestic sales law 280 ). Thus, where the parties do not choose the applicable law when excluding the CISG, the courts will have to determine the applicable law by means of objective connecting factors; since these factors, at least in Europe, 281 lead to the application of a "law of a country", 282 courts will not be able to apply non-binding rules, such as the UNI-DROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts (hereinafter: UNIDROIT Principles). 283 Where, on the other hand, the parties choose the applicable law, it is on the basis of their rules of private international that courts have to determine whether the choice is to be taken into account, which is it, at least in those countries the rules of private international law of which are laid down by either the Rome Convention or the Rome I Regulation.
Where, on the contrary, the parties modify the effect of provisions of the CISG through the contract, the rules to be resorted to are basically those laid down in the contract itself. This does not mean, however, that resort to private international is completely superfluous in this line of cases either. The courts will in any case have to determine whether the various contract clauses violate the mandatory rules of the law applicable to be determined once again on the basis of the ruels of private international law.
This goes to show that resort to private international law may also be relevant even if the contract meets all of the CISG's applicability requirements and the issue to be dealt with is one governed by the CISG, given the parties' possibility to exclude the CISG or derogate from its provisions.
XIV. The Principle of Freedom from Form Reqirements and the Article 96 Reservation
Resort to private internatonal may, however, be necessary even where all applicability requirements are met, the issue to be dealt with falls into the CISG's scope of application and the parties have not excluded the CISG or derogated from its provisions. This is true as regards the issue of formal validity of contracts governed by Article 11 of the CISG which, according to both commentators 284 and courts, 285 sets forth the principle of freedom from form requirements. Thus, a contract for the international sale of goods does generally not need to be concluded in writing and is not subject to any other specific requirement as to form. 286 This means, inter alia, 287 that a contract can, as already confirmed by various court decisions, also be concluded orally 288 as well as through the conduct of the parties. 289 Still, pursuant to Article 12 of the CISG, which the parties are not allowed to derogate from, 290 the foregoing principle does not necessarily apply where at least one of the parties to the contract governed by the CISG has its place of business in a State that has declared a reservation under Article 96 of the CISG. 291 In this line of cases, any provision "that allows a contract of sale or its modification or termination by agreement or any offer, acceptance or other indication of intention to be made in any form other than in writing does not apply."
292 This means, in other words, that Article 12 leads to the principle of freedom from writing requirements set forth in Article 11 CISG not being applicable per se when one party has its relevant place of business in a State that IHR 3/2012 113 | declared an Article 96 reservation. 293 What consequences this has on the applicable writing requirements is subject to dispute. According to one view, the sole fact that one party has its place of business in a State that declared an Article 96 reservation does not necessarily mean that the writing requirements of that State will apply. 294 In this author's opinion, this view is to be preferred over the view that where one party has its relevant place of business in a State that declared an Article 96 reservation, the contract must necessarily be concluded or evidenced or modified in writing. 295 The law to be applied (and, thus, whether a given writing requirement must be met) will depend on the law to which the rules of private international of the forum lead. 296 Thus, where the private international law of the forum leads to the law of a Contracting State that has declared an Article 96 reservation, that State's writing requirements will have to be applied. Where, however, the rules of private international law lead to the law of a Contracting State that has not declared an Article 96 reservation, the contract will not need to meet any writing requirement, a view also held in case law. 297 This shows how important resort to private international law is despite the CISG being applicable, the issue being one of those governed by the CISG and the parties not having exluced the CISG.
XV. Conclusion
The preceding remarks show that the CISG's coming into force has not made recourse to private international law superfluous. This is due, among others, to the fact that the CISG does not govern all international contracts for the sale of goods: some contracts are not "international" enough to meet the CISG's internationality requirement set forth its Article 1(1). 298 Some other contracts are not governed by the CISG due the CISG's limited substantive sphere of application, which is owed to the fact that the drafters of the CISG themselves recognized that their unification effort could not fit all contracts 299 and therefore expressly excluded some contracts from its substantive sphere of application. 300 Other contracts involve parties that are linked to countries that simply do not want the CISG to apply to certain issues or to contracts with certain parties and therefore have declared reservations that make the CISG either totally or partially inapplicable. 301 Also, even where the CISG is applicable, it does not necessarily solve a given issue, since, as pointed out, the CISG does not constitute an exhaustive body of rules. 302 Furthermore, the parties' possibility to exclude the CISG or derogate from (most of) its provisions 303 shows that recourse to private international law is not pre-empted even where all of the CISG applicability requirements are met and the issue falls into the CISG's scope of application. But even where the parties have not optedout of the CISG and the CISG governs a given issue, resort to private international law may be required. 304 From this is clearly follows that it is an oversimplification to state that the CISG makes resort to private international law superfluous. By creating a (false) sense of certainty as to the rules applicable to a contract for the international sale of goods, 305 namely those of the CISG, this oversimplification may be more dangerous for one's interests, and, ultimately, more costly than the awareness of the CISG constituting an incomplete 306 set of default rules 307 with a litimted applicability. Only when there is awareness as to the the CISG's limitations and, thus, to its non-autarkic character, 308 can one really understand the relationship between the CISG and private international law which is not an antagonistic one; the CISG and the rules of private international law necessarily co-exist. For the elaboration of future unification efforts this should be taken into account, since only if the elaboration of uniform sunstantive law rules goes hand in hand with the elaboration of uniform private international law rules can one really reach uniform solutions.
